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Erie’s Constitutional Source
Bradford R. Clark†

Introduction
The constitutional rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 has
remained elusive for almost seventy years. Three decades ago, Paul Mishkin
argued in a brief but influential article that Erie rests on “constitutional
principles which restrain the power of the federal courts to intrude upon the
states’ determination of substantive policy in areas which the Constitution and
Congress have left to state competence.”2 Professor Mishkin wrote his article in
response to John Hart Ely’s recent attempt to debunk “the myth of Erie.”3
Mishkin understood Erie as imposing a constitutional restraint on the federal
courts, but read Ely as treating “the Constitution as relevant only in terms of
Congress’ power to displace state substantive law” and not as an independent
restriction on “the power of the federal courts to do so.”4 Mishkin grounded his
contrary understanding “on the structure established by the Constitution
whereby the states, and their interests as such, are represented in the Congress
but not in the federal courts.”5 Invoking the separation of powers, Mishkin
concluded that “the Constitution bears not only on congressional power but
also imposes a distinctive, independently significant limit on the authority of
the federal courts to displace state law.”6
Professor Mishkin’s article remains a key reference in the field because
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1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
1682, 1688 (1974).
3. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 704 (1974).
4. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 1682.
5. Id. at 1685.
6. Id. at 1682.
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scholars continue to debate the precise contours—and even the existence—of
the constitutional basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie. Mishkin’s
unique contribution was to link federalism with the constitutional separation of
powers. This account of Erie’s constitutional rationale is insightful and, in my
view, correct. It may be fortified, however, by an additional structural argument
that ties Erie directly to the Supremacy Clause. That Clause recognizes only the
“Constitution,” “Laws,” and “Treaties” as “the supreme Law of the Land,”7 and
thus incorporates three distinct sets of federal lawmaking procedures found
elsewhere in the Constitution. By design, all of these procedures safeguard
federalism by requiring the participation and assent of the states or their
representatives in the Senate. For this reason, the constitutional structure
strongly suggests that the Supremacy Clause establishes the exclusive basis for
disregarding state law, and that more expansive judicial doctrines like Swift are
unconstitutional. Reliance on these features of the constitutional structure is
implicit in the Erie opinion and provides formal substantiation of Professor
Mishkin’s sound intuitions about Erie, the separation of powers, and
federalism.
This paper has two parts. Part I describes the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Swift v. Tyson and Erie and the ongoing debate about the precise
constitutional rationale underlying Erie. Part II explains how the Supremacy
Clause incorporates separation of powers to safeguard federalism. Properly
understood, Erie recognizes the exclusivity of the Supremacy Clause and
enforces the political and procedural safeguards of federalism built into the
Clause.
I
ERIE’s Elusive Rationale
In Erie, “the Supreme Court instituted something of a constitutional
revolution”8 by holding that the Swift doctrine had been “‘an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by the courts of the United States’”9 and should be
abandoned. To this day, commentators continue to debate the existence and
precise nature of the constitutional defect underlying the Swift doctrine.10
Properly understood, Erie rests on recognition of the Supremacy Clause as the
exclusive basis for displacing state law, and on the procedural and “political

7. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1245, 1256 (1996) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Common Law].
9. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
10. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that “[t]he
constitutional basis for the Erie decision has confounded scholars”); Jack Goldsmith & Steven
Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 673, 676 (1998) (noting that
Erie’s “holding has been subject to disagreement and controversy over the years”).
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safeguards of federalism”11 built into the Clause. These interlocking features of
the constitutional structure “compel[led]”12 the Court in Erie to hold that
federal courts lack constitutional power to displace state law in favor of their
own notions of sound public policy.13
A. The Swift Doctrine
14

In Swift v. Tyson the Supreme Court held that federal courts were free to
disregard state court decisions and exercise independent judgment on questions
of so-called general law. Swift began as a suit between citizens of different
states involving an unsettled question of commercial law—i.e., whether
acceptance of a negotiable instrument in satisfaction of a preexisting debt
constituted consideration sufficient to confer upon the recipient the status of “a
bona fide holder.”15 Although several prior New York decisions suggested that
such consideration was inadequate,16 the Supreme Court exercised its own
independent judgment and concluded that the release of a preexisting debt was
11. The “political safeguards of federalism” refer to the role of the states “in the
composition and selection of the central government.” Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 543 (1954).
12. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
13. The analysis of Swift, Erie, and the Supremacy Clause presented in this paper is drawn
in part from my earlier writings on the subject. For further analysis, see Bradford R. Clark,
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1412–22 (2001)
[hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers]; Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several
States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459, 1474–95 (1997)
[hereinafter Clark, Ascertaining]; Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1256–64, 1277–
92.
14. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
15. Id. at 16.
16. In Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822), the New York Supreme Court for
the Correction of Errors recognized “[t]he general rule . . . that where negotiable paper is
transferred for valuable consideration, and without notice of any fraud, the right of the holder shall
prevail against the true owner.” Id. at 644–45 (Woodworth, J.). The court, however, concluded
that the defendants in Coddington were not entitled to the benefit of the rule because they had not
given “valuable consideration” for the notes. Strictly speaking, the question whether the release of
a preexisting debt constitutes valuable consideration was not presented in Coddington because the
defendants admitted that at the time they received the notes, the persons from whom they received
them “were not, in a strict legal sense, indebted to [the defendants] in any amount whatever.” Id.
at 644 (Woodworth, J.). Nonetheless, several of the opinions suggested that an antecedent debt is
not a valuable consideration under the rule. See id. at 648 (Woodworth, J.); id. at 651 (Spencer,
C.J.); id. at 655 (Viele, Sen.). Although the Supreme Court for the Correction of Errors had not
“pronounced any positive opinion upon” the question when Swift was decided, Swift, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) at 18, several lower court decisions had ruled in accordance with Coddington's dicta. See,
e.g., Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); Rosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. 85 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1833); Wardell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 170 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832). The Court in Swift noted
that “the more recent [New York] cases ... have greatly shaken, if they have not entirely
overthrown [the earlier] decisions,” 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 17, but the Court was willing to assume
arguendo that “the doctrine [was] fully settled in New York” that “a pre-existing debt was not a
sufficient consideration to shut out the equities of the original parties in favor of the holders,” id.
at 17–18.
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adequate consideration.17 The Court viewed the question as one of “general
commercial law,”18 upon which the Court was free “to express [its] own
opinion.”19
Swift was arguably defensible when decided because state and federal
courts alike considered questions of general commercial law at the time to be
governed by the law merchant, a branch of the law of nations.20 In the early
nineteenth century, both sets of courts “considered themselves to be deciding
questions under a general law merchant that was neither distinctively state nor
federal.”21 On this understanding, the courts of each sovereign felt free to
exercise independent judgment to ascertain applicable customs and, when
17. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19–22.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id. at 19.
20. See Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1277–92. The law merchant was “a
particular system of customs . . . which, however different from . . . the common law, is . . .
allowed, for the benefit of trade,” and “which all nations agree in and take notice of.” 1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *75, *264. Such law was traditionally based on the commercial
customs and practices of merchants and was applied by all “civilized” nations to resolve disputes
among merchants from different countries. See id. at *75 (“[A] particular system of customs ...
called the custom of merchants, or lex mercatoria ... is ... allowed, for the benefit of trade, to be of
the utmost validity in all commercial transactions ....”). Nations and states followed the law
merchant in order to facilitate international and interstate trade by establishing uniform rules to
govern transactions among diverse citizens. See id. at *264 (“[A]s these are transactions carried on
between the subjects of independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the
other. For which reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by ... the law merchant or lex
mercatoria, which all nations agree in and take notice of.”); Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of the Law
of Evidence, in Civil and Criminal Cases, and a Treatise on Bills of Exchange, and Promissory
Notes at ix (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke 1810) (“In questions of commercial law, the decisions of
Courts, in all civilized, and commercial nations, are to be regarded, for the purpose of establishing
uniform principles in the commercial world.”). See generally Francis M. Burdick, What Is the Law
Merchant?, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 470 (1902). William Fletcher points out that “[t]he concept of a
uniform law merchant was quite naturally imported into the treatment of commercial law by
American courts,” William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1518 (1984),
because the general common law was regarded at the time as a “great universal law,” “regularly
and constantly adhered to.” 4 Blackstone, supra, at 67.
21. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1554. Swift made this point explicitly: “It is observable,
that the courts of New York do not found their decisions [regarding the adequacy of
consideration], upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they deduce
the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law.” Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. On
questions of this kind, “the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as
ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal analogies, . . . what is the just rule
furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case.” Id. at 19. At the time, New
York courts took the same approach. For example, in Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y.
1822), the New York Court for the Correction of Errors recognized “[t]he general rule ... that
where negotiable paper is transferred for a valuable consideration, and without notice of any
fraud, the right of the holder shall prevail against the true owner.” Id. at 644–45 (Woodworth, J.).
The court considered the rule to be “well established,” id. at 647 (Woodworth, J.), and consistent
with “the usual course of trade.” Id. at 651 (Spencer, C.J.). That the court recognized this rule as
part of the general law merchant is suggested by Chief Judge Spencer’s observation that the rule
“is not only right in itself, but the contrary doctrine would destroy the circulation of notes, and
would justly alarm the mercantile world.” Id.
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necessary, to reach conclusions contrary to those of the other.22 Taken in
historical context, the Swift Court arguably did no more than what New York
law instructed it to do—i.e., to exercise independent judgment to ascertain the
applicable rule of customary commercial law. For this reason, “Swift appears to
have been regarded when it was decided as little more than a decision on the
law of negotiable instruments.”23 So long as New York courts continued to
decide interstate commercial disputes according to a general body of customary
commercial law rather than “local usage,” Swift was arguably consistent with
the constitutional structure because federal courts were not disregarding state
law. Indeed, given the prevailing assumptions about the nature and applicability
of general law, the Swift Court saw no need even to defend its approach in
constitutional terms.
Two subsequent developments severely undermined the constitutional
legitimacy of the Swift doctrine and led the Erie Court to disavow it. As an
initial matter, state courts gradually abandoned reliance on the general law
merchant in favor of localized commercial doctrines. Following Swift, states
increasingly regarded commercial law as an aspect of their local law rather than
as a matter of general law. Both state courts and state legislatures participated
in this shift. State courts eventually abandoned the ideal of a universal law
merchant and began to formulate commercial doctrines as a matter of local
law.24 At the same time, state legislatures enacted specific statutes to govern
commercial transactions within their jurisdiction.25 Notwithstanding the states’
22. For example, in Swift, the Supreme Court looked to “the principles established in the
general commercial law,” rather than to the decisions of New York state courts, in deciding a
dispute between citizens of different states arising under the law merchant. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
at 18. The Court noted that such decisions “are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate
attention and respect of this court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority,
by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.” Id. at 19. Likewise, New York
courts considered themselves equally free to disregard the Supreme Court’s decisions on questions
of general commercial law. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1561 (“State courts generally followed
common law decisions by the United States Supreme Court, but they were quite explicit in stating
that they did not do so because of any legal compulsion.”). Just two years after Swift, counsel
urged New York’s highest court to conform its decision “to the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in the
recent case of Swift v. Tyson.” Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93, 95 (N.Y. 1843). Although
recognizing that on “question[s] of commercial law, ... it is desirable that there should be, as far as
practicable, uniformity of decision, not only between the courts of the several states and of the
United States, but also between our courts and those of England,” the New York court declined to
follow the rule embraced in Swift and described the Supreme Court as a “tribunal, whose decisions
are not of paramount authority” on such questions. Id. at 95, 112. Accord Waln v. Thompson, 9
Serg. & Rawle 115, 122 (Pa. 1822) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
have no obligatory authority over this court, except in cases growing out of the constitution, of
which this is not one.”).
23. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1514.
24. See Lyman D. Brewster, The Promotion of Uniform Legislation, 6 Yale L.J. 132, 140
(1897) (arguing for “statutory unity rather than [judicial] diversity, in matters of common
interest”).
25. See E. Allen Farnsworth & John Honnold, Commercial Law 5 (4th ed. 1985) (noting
that “[b]y 1890 every state had at least one statute on negotiable instruments”).
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abandonment of the law merchant, federal judges continued to apply Swift and
to disregard state court decisions in favor of their own conceptions of general
commercial law. Accordingly, federal and state courts developed divergent
approaches, injecting considerable instability into the Swift regime.
To make matters worse, federal courts simultaneously expanded the Swift
doctrine well beyond its commercial law origins to encompass numerous
questions traditionally governed by local law. One of the most significant steps
in this expansion was the Court’s decision to disregard state tort law in favor of
so-called “general law.” In an 1862 case concerning liability for negligence, the
Court declared that “where private rights are to be determined by the
application of common law rules alone, this Court, although entertaining for
State tribunals the highest respect, does not feel bound by their decisions.”26
This trend continued and by the time the Court decided Erie, federal courts
claimed the right to exercise independent judgment with respect to dozens of
historically local law questions including negligence, punitive damages, and
property rights.27 Unlike commercial disputes, such matters had never been
considered by state courts to be governed by general law.
These two developments—the continued application of the Swift doctrine
to commercial questions and its expansion to traditionally local matters—
transformed the Swift doctrine from largely defensible to essentially
illegitimate. Federal courts now appeared to be freely disregarding state law
with no clear warrant in the Constitution for doing so. These developments also
made the outcome in diversity cases turn in large measure on whether they
were brought in federal or state court. In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Baugh,28 Justice Field openly challenged the constitutionality of the Court’s
decision to disregard the Ohio common law of fellow servant liability in favor
of “general law.” Although acknowledging that he had applied the Swift
doctrine in the past, Justice Field believed that “there stands, as a perpetual
protest against its repetition, the constitution of the United States, which
recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the states.”29
Justice Holmes took the same position, characterizing the Swift doctrine as “an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States which
no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to
correct.”30

26. Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428–29 (1862).
27. See Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases in American
Federalism 71 (1981) (observing that “the federal judiciary continued to enlarge the body of
general law so that by 1890 it included some 26 doctrines”); Erie, 304 U.S. at 75–76 (detailing the
expansion of the Swift doctrine).
28. 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
29. Id. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting).
30. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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B. The Erie Opinion
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,31 the Supreme Court declared the Swift
doctrine to be an unconstitutional assumption of power by the courts of the
United States. Erie began as a seemingly routine application of the Swift
regime. While walking alongside the railroad tracks, Tompkins, a citizen of
Pennsylvania, was struck by an object protruding from a passing train.
Tompkins sued the railroad, a New York corporation, in federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship.32 The railroad’s liability turned on the duty of
care it owed to a pedestrian walking along the right of way. The railroad argued
that Tompkins was a trespasser under Pennsylvania law and “that the railroad is
not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence,
unless it be wanton or willful.”33 Tompkins, by contrast, argued that “the
railroad’s duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of
general law.”34 The court of appeals agreed with Tompkins,35 and the railroad
obtained review in the Supreme Court.
In an opinion by Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court reversed and,
although neither party asked it to do so, overruled Swift. The Court’s opinion
proceeded in four parts. First, the Court noted its disagreement with Swift’s
interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,36 also known as the
Rules of Decision Act. According to the Court, Swift “held that federal courts
exercising [diversity] jurisdiction . . . need not, in matters of general
jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the State as declared by its highest
court.”37 The Court observed that there had been widespread doubt “as to the
correctness of the construction given section 34,”38 and relied on “the more
recent research of a competent scholar” to establish “that the construction given
to it by the Court was erroneous.”39
Second, the Court pointed out the “political and social” defects of the
Swift doctrine.40 These included the lack of uniformity in state and federal court
on questions of general common law,41 uncertainty regarding the line between
general and local law,42 and discrimination resulting “from the wide range of
persons held entitled to avail themselves of the federal rule by resort to the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) (codifying the current version of the Rules of Decision

Act).
37. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
38. Id. at 72.
39. Id. (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923)).
40. Id. at 74.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”43 For these reasons, the Court declared
that “the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.”44 At the
end of this section of its opinion, the Court made clear that these defects merely
illustrated the “injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine,”45 and were not
sufficient to warrant overruling Swift. According to Justice Brandeis, “[i]f only
a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared
to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and
compels us to do so.”46
In the third part of its opinion, the Erie Court turned to the Constitution.
The Court did not invoke any specific provision of the Constitution, and the
Court’s constitutional rationale is set forth in a relatively brief passage:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in
a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or “general,” be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.47
Although this passage is somewhat cryptic, the Court made its conclusion
unmistakably clear. The Swift doctrine was “‘an unconstitutional assumption of
powers by the Courts of the United States’”48 because “in applying the doctrine
this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are
reserved by the Constitution to the several States.”49 What Erie failed to
43. Id. at 76.
44. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
45. Id. at 77.
46. Id. at 77-78. This statement is significant because Justice Brandeis was a strong
proponent of stare decisis, at least in statutory cases. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1389, 1415–18 (2005) (discussing the importance of statutory stare decisis).
47. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. As Professor Ely points out, the Erie opinion “has been faulted
for failing to indicate precisely what constitutional provision Swift v. Tyson’s interpretation of the
Rules of Decision Act violated.” Ely, supra note 3, at 702.
48. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 534 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
49. Id. at 80. The fourth part of the Court’s opinion remanded the case to the circuit court
with instructions to ascertain the precise nature of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
under Pennsylvania law. Id. The circuit court had originally “declined to decide the issue of state
law” because it erroneously “ruled that the question of liability is one of general law.” Id. For an
in depth and insightful history of Erie, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive
Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century
America (2000).
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explain was the precise source of these constitutional commands.
C. Debating Erie’s Constitutional Rationale
Because the constitutional rationale of Erie is unclear, commentators have
offered sharply divergent views regarding the constitutional theory underlying
the decision. Some argued that, in light of the Court’s reinterpretation of the
Judiciary Act, its constitutional discussion was mere dictum.50 Similarly, some
suggested that Erie’s reliance on the Constitution was unnecessary because the
case could have been decided on grounds of policy or judicial practice.51 As
Alfred Hill has explained, however, “it is difficult to view as dictum the
Court’s statement of a legal proposition without which, we are assured in the
opinion, and have no reason to doubt, the case would have been decided the
other way.”52 Under these circumstances, if there was dictum in the Erie
opinion, it was the Court’s reinterpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act
rather than its discussion of the constitutionality of the Swift doctrine.
Some commentators simply denied that state common law decisions bind
federal courts at all and called for reinstatement of the Swift doctrine. For
example, writing three years after Erie, one commentator criticized the decision
as “judicial legislation” and “constitutional amendment by decision.”53
According to this view, Article III “invests the federal courts with complete
independence of decision in all causes to which the federal judicial power is
made to extend.”54 This means that “[i]n determining and disposing of such
causes, the federal courts are an end unto themselves and need neither consult
nor defer to the decisions of any other tribunal or judicial system.”55 In
addition, the “grant of judicial power to the federal courts in Article III is not
coextensive with, but is broader than, the grant of legislative powers to the
Congress.”56 Likewise, other commentators wrote that “[a]ny attempt to attack
50. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L.J. 267, 278 (1946); Harry Shulman, The Demise of
Swift v. Tyson, 47 Yale L.J. 1336, 1344, 1347 (1938).
51. See Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 644
(1938) (suggesting that “the Court might well have avoided resort to statutory or constitutional
grounds, and placed its decision solely on grounds of sound practice for the Federal courts”).
52. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427, 439
(1958); see also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 385–86 (1964) (“A court’s stated and, on its view, necessary basis for
deciding does not become dictum because a critic would have decided on another basis.”).
53. Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision—More on the Erie Case, 30 Ky.
L.J. 3, 57 (1941).
54. Id. at 56.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 31. More recently, Professor Peter Strauss has suggested that, for contexts in
which Congress has legislative power, “the constitutional description of judicial power …
imagined that the federal courts Congress could create to exercise that power would be courts in
the ordinary understanding—that is, common law courts or equity courts of that time.” Peter L.
Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891, 909
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Swift v. Tyson on constitutional grounds is untenable,”57 and that the Court
should “[r]everse Erie and return to Swift v. Tyson.”58
Commentators were also quick to dispute any suggestion that Erie rests on
traditional notions of limited federal power under the Tenth Amendment.59 The
Amendment, of course, provides that the “powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”60 The Court’s opinion might be
interpreted to implicate this principle because it contains both general
references to “the autonomy and independence of the States”61 and the rights
“reserved by the Constitution to the several States,”62 and specific references to
Congress’s lack of “power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State”63 and “rules of decision which Congress was confessedly
without power to enact as statutes.”64 Commentators characterized these
references as “the Achilles tendon of the opinion”65 because by 1938 it seemed
clear that the Court would uphold Congress’s constitutional power to prescribe
the duty of care that interstate railroads owe to pedestrians.66 In any event, even
(2002). During the Swift era, he points out, federal courts “quite clearly understood that their task
was accommodating general law, never expressed by anyone but judges, to the realities of a new
continent and a new age.” Id. at 910. And the dictum of Swift itself, if not later Court decisions,
placed it within easy reach of the Interstate Commerce Clause.
57. Arthur John Keeffe, John J. Gilhooley, George H. Bailey & Donald S. Day, Weary
Erie, 34 Cornell L.Q. 494, 524 (1949).
58. Id. at 526. Some modern commentators have made similar arguments. See, e.g.,
Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a
Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 79 (1993) (suggesting that Erie does not
rest on constitutional grounds and should be reconsidered); G. Edward White, A Customary
International Law of Torts, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 755, 789 (2006) (stating that “the opinion in Erie is
remarkably cryptic, assertive, and quite possibly wrong-headed as a matter of historical and
jurisprudential analysis”).
59. See Charles T. McCormick & Elvin Hale Hewins, The Collapse of “General Law” in
the Federal Courts, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 126, 133–36 (1938); T.A. Cowan, Constitutional Aspects of the
Abolition of Federal “Common Law,” 1 La. L. Rev. 161, 169–72 (1938).
60. U.S. Const. amend. X.
61. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (internal quotations omitted).
62. Id. at 80.
63. Id. at 78.
64. Id. at 72. Upon reflection, it is not surprising that Justice Brandeis endorsed a vision
of limited federal power since he regarded states as useful “laboratories for experimentation.”
New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For an
insightful discussion of this idea, see, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 85-88
(1995).
65. McCormick & Hewins, supra note 59, at 134.
66. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that Congress
has the power to exercise control over intrastate activities that have a close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce). Chief Justice Stone, who joined the Erie opinion, apparently was not
fully persuaded by the Court’s limited view of congressional power: “‘[I] do not think it is at all
clear that Congress could not apply (enact) substantive rules to be applied by federal courts. I
think that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins did not settle that question, notwithstanding some
unfortunate dicta in the opinion.’” Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law
480 (1956) (quoting Letter from Harlan Stone to Owen J. Roberts (Jan. 3, 1941)). See generally
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if the Erie Court meant to endorse a narrower view of congressional power, that
view has been “rendered unimportant by the expansion of congressional
lawmaking power since 1938”67 and was arguably dictum even at the time
because Congress had not enacted an applicable federal statute.68 Perhaps for
these reasons, even commentators like Mishkin (who otherwise embraced
Erie’s constitutional grounding) seemed unpersuaded by this aspect of the
Court’s opinion.69
Although garnering little attention when Erie was decided, the Supreme
Court’s statement that “the [Swift] doctrine rendered impossible equal
protection of the law”70 eventually led some modern commentators to suggest
that the decision may rest on the equal protection “component” of the Fifth
Amendment.71 This reading, however, is both inconsistent with the structure of
the Court’s opinion and anachronistic. As discussed, Erie’s reference to “equal
protection” appears in a preliminary section of the opinion describing the
“political and social” defects of the Swift doctrine rather than the section
specifically addressing “the unconstitutionality of the course pursued.”72 More
fundamentally, at the time the Court decided Erie, it had not yet interpreted the
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to (reverse) incorporate an equal
protection component applicable to the federal government.73 The
Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1258 (noting the Court’s broad grant of federal
authority in its Commerce Clause cases and its contemporaneous denial of similar authority in
Erie).
67. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 10, at 677. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (holding that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause extends to certain intrastate
activities that, in aggregate, affect interstate commerce). But see Ely, supra note 3, at 703 (stating
that the Swift doctrine “was unconstitutional because nothing in the Constitution provided the
central government with the general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court had been exercising
under Swift”).
68. See Mason, supra note 66, at 480–81 (quoting Letter from Harlan Stone to Felix
Frankfurter (Apr. 29, 1938)) (“Beyond [the federal courts’ unconstitutional assumption of powers]
it was unnecessary to go.”).
69. See Mishkin, supra note 2, at 1684 n.10 (suggesting that Congress could have used its
power under the Commerce Clause to enact a rule of decision act contrary to the result in Erie).
Cf. Hill, supra note 52, at 445 (stating that “it seems fair to infer” that Justice Brandeis “meant
that Congress has no power to adopt a code of laws governing wholly intrastate questions of
contract or tort which would be binding upon the federal and state courts alike”).
70. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
71. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal
Courts, 45 Duke L.J. 929, 998–99 (1996) (discussing the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection
component as a possible basis for the Court’s decision in Erie); John R. Leathers, Erie and its
Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 791, 795–96 (1974) (same).
72. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74, 77–78.
73. On the development of Fifth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence, compare
LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) (rejecting an equality-based
challenge on the ground that “[t]he Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause”) with
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (subjecting federal racial classification to equal
protection scrutiny for the first time). See also Bradford R. Clark, Judicial Review of
Congressional Section Five Action: The Fallacy of Reverse Incorporation, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1969, 1970–72 (1984) (discussing the origin and development of reverse incorporation).
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unavailability of an equal protection claim against the federal government in
1938 confirms that Erie simply used the phrase in its broader, nonconstitutional sense.74
Alfred Hill was one of the first commentators to seek to identify and
defend Erie’s constitutional rationale at any length. His thesis was “that Erie
does indeed have a constitutional basis—in the sense that our system of
federalism is rooted in the Constitution, and that the failure of a federal court to
give due regard to state law . . . inevitably thwarts the constitutional scheme of
things.”75 His central insight was that “even if a particular area is one in which
the federal government has power to make independent law, it does not follow
that a federal court also has power to do so, for the power of the federal courts
does not correspond in all respects with the power of the federal government as
a whole.”76 For example, “there are vast reaches within the scope of the
commerce clause which have always been deemed to be subject to the
sovereign power of the states until preempted for the federal prerogative by
action of Congress.”77 Unless and until Congress overrides state law, “the law
of the states furnishes the rule of decision” for both federal and state courts.78
In other words, the problem with the Swift doctrine was that federal courts
increasingly “made” law unilaterally by disregarding state law without even
purporting to rely on an applicable federal statute.79
74. See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, § 5.3 (stating that Erie’s reference to equal
protection “appears to be a rhetorical rather than a constitutional argument because the Supreme
Court had not yet applied the requirements of equal protection to the federal government”); Ely,
supra note 3, at 713 (suggesting that Erie’s invocation of equal protection “was a metaphor” for
unfairness rather than a constitutional pronouncement); White, supra note 58, at 795 (stating that,
despite Erie’s evocative language, the Court “did not mean that Swift violated the Equal Protection
Clause”).
75. Hill, supra note 52, at 427–28.
76. Id. at 441; see also id. at 440 (explaining “the limited sense in which the judicial
function is a law-making function”).
77. Id. at 442.
78. Id.
79. See Purcell, supra note 49, at 172 (“Absent compelling reason, the federal courts
should not make law even in areas within the national legislative power unless and until Congress
made the initial decision to assert national authority in that area.”). Professor G. Edward White
has recently challenged Erie’s suggestion that federal courts lack power to declare common law
rules in areas where Congress had not acted as both “historically inaccurate and jurisprudentially
anachronistic.” White, supra note 58, at 797. He points out that early republican commentators
“treated the Constitution’s language, which defined the ‘judicial power’ of the federal courts as
extending to ‘all Cases, in Law and Equity,’ as giving the federal courts power to declare
substantive common law rules.” Id. at 798-99. The early controversy over federal common law
crimes, however, reveals at least some disagreement on this point. For example, James Madison
objected to this conception of the judicial power on the ground that it “would confer on the
judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative power.” James Madison, Report on the
Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 7, 1800), reprinted in 6 The Writings of James Madison 380 (Galliard
Hunt ed., 1906). Similarly, in rejecting federal common law crimes, the Supreme Court stated that
before federal courts may exercise “jurisdiction in criminal cases,” United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812), the “legislative authority of the Union must first
make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of
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John Hart Ely essentially sidestepped this separation-of-powers aspect of
Erie in his famous article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie.80 Instead, Professor
Ely focused on Justice Harlan’s substantive suggestion in Hanna v. Plumer81
that “our constitutional system leaves [certain matters] to state regulation,”82
and that federal courts undercut this allocation if they “can make substantive
law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative
powers.”83 Ely labeled Harlan’s approach “the state enclave theory” of
Erie,84 and argued that Harlan “helped perpetuate a constitutional
misapprehension”85—namely, “the myth of Erie”86 and “the belief that it
carried some special constitutional magic of a sort that transcended ordinary
issues of federal power.”87 According to Ely, the Constitution’s “function in
‘Erie contexts’ is no different from its function respecting other issues of
federal power.”88 In his view, the relevant question was whether “the
Constitution provided the central government with a general lawmaking
authority of the sort the Court had been exercising under Swift.”89 Because “the
answer was no,”90 Ely believed that Erie correctly overruled Swift.
Two prominent scholars were quick to question Professor Ely’s conflation
of federal legislative and judicial power, and to stress Erie’s distinctive
character as a limitation on the lawmaking power of federal courts (as opposed
to the federal government as a whole). First, in the course of reviewing the
second edition of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal
System (co-authored by Professor Mishkin), Henry Monaghan stressed that
“Erie is, fundamentally, a limitation on the federal court’s power to displace
state law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate which
neither the general language of article III nor the jurisdictional statute
provides.”91 Second, responding specifically to Ely, Professor Mishkin argued
the offence.” Id. at 34. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 1403-12 (discussing
federal common law crimes in light of Erie and the constitutional structure).
80. 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974).
81. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
82. Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 474–75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
84. Ely, supra note 3, at 701.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 704.
87. Id. at 705.
88. Id. at 706.
89. Id. at 703 (emphasis added).
90. Ely, supra note 3, at 704.
91. Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 892 (1974). Professor
Monaghan elaborated on this point a year later in his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review:
“[Erie] recognizes that federal judicial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the
scope of dormant congressional power. Rather, the Court must point to some source, such as a
statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as authority for the creation of substantive federal law.”
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (1975); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum.
L. Rev. 277, 314 n.199 (1984) (explaining that “there is no general federal judicial power to
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“that the Constitution bears not only on congressional power but also imposes a
distinctive, independently significant limit on the authority of the federal courts
to displace state law.”92
More specifically, Mishkin took issue with Ely’s apparent premise that in
the absence of statutory constraints, “the courts would have the same range of
lawmaking power as Congress—that any time Congress could validly displace
state law, the federal courts are constitutionally equally empowered to do so.”93
Unlike Ely, Mishkin saw a constitutional difference between the power of
Congress and the power of federal courts “to make federal law displacing state
substantive policy.”94 Apart from any constitutional limits on the scope of
federal power in general, “[p]rinciples related to the separation of powers
impose an additional limit on the authority of federal courts to engage in
lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by Congress).”95 Mishkin based his
understanding primarily “on the structure established by the Constitution
whereby the states, and their interests as such, are represented in the Congress
but not in the federal courts.”96 According to Mishkin, these “constitutional
underpinnings” may explain the vitality of the so-called “myth of Erie.”97
II
The Role of the Supremacy Clause
At the time when Professors Mishkin and Monaghan wrote, scholars often
relied on sound intuitions informed by the general constitutional structure or
accepted traditions rather than on more formal excavations of the Constitution’s
text, history, and structure. With respect to Erie, their instincts find quite direct
and elaborate support in the original design of the Supremacy Clause and
associated aspects of the constitutional structure. The Supremacy Clause is the
mechanism that the Founders chose to resolve conflicts between state and
federal law. The Clause designates only three sources of law as “the supreme
Law of the Land”—i.e., the “Constitution,” “Laws,” and “Treaties” of the
United States. The Constitution elsewhere prescribes precise procedures to
govern the adoption of each source of supreme federal law, and all of these
procedures tended to preserve the governance prerogatives of the states by
incorporating the political safeguards of federalism. These interlocking features
of the constitutional structure suggest that the Supremacy Clause establishes the
exclusive basis for overriding state law. Thus, in the absence of an applicable
rule of decision supplied by the “Constitution,” “Laws,” or “Treaties” of the

displace state law”).
92. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 1682.
93. Id. at 1683.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1685.
97. Id. at 1688.
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United States, federal courts simply lack constitutional authority to disregard
state law. In this sense, the precise constitutional source of the Erie decision is
the Supremacy Clause.
A. The Supremacy Clause
At the Constitutional Convention, the Founders decided from the start to
preserve “the states as separate sources of authority and organs of
administration” rather than to abolish them in favor of a consolidated central
government.98 At the same time, the Founders recognized the need to go
beyond the Articles of Confederation and create a federal government capable
of acting, within its assigned powers, “directly on the population rather than
mediately through the states.”99 As a consequence, the Founders understood
that there would be two governments often operating at the same time, within
the same territory, and upon the same people.100 Such a system would
necessarily give rise to conflicts between state and federal law. Thus, it was
crucial to the success of the enterprise to establish a mechanism for resolving
such conflicts.
The Founders considered three potential alternatives: (1) military force to
coerce state adherence to federal law; (2) congressional power to negative state
law; and (3) judicial enforcement of “supreme” federal law over contrary state
law.101 The Founders quickly dismissed the first option,102 and rejected the
second after extensive consideration.103 The third option—a Supremacy
Clause—was initially rejected as part of the New Jersey Plan,104 but later
revived after the Convention granted the states equal suffrage in the Senate.105
The Supremacy Clause performs the essential function of instructing

98. Wechsler, supra note 11, at 543.
99. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 169 (1996); see also Wechsler, supra note 11, at 543 (“Our constitution makers
established a central government authorized to act directly upon individuals through its own
agencies—and thus they formed a nation capable of function and of growth.”).
100. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 1347.
101. See id. at 1348–55; see also Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a
Constraint on Federal Power, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 91, 105–111 (2003) [hereinafter Clark,
Supremacy Clause].
102. James Madison, The Records of the Federal Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 45, 54 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“A Union of the
States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction.”) (James Madison)
[hereinafter Farrand’s Records].
103. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 1349–53. Delegates from the
smaller states objected strongly to this mechanism. For example, Elbridge Gerry, of
Massachusetts, remarked that “[t]he Natl. Legislature with such a power may enslave the States,”
and predicted that “[s]uch an idea as this will never be acceded to.” James Madison, The Records
of the Federal Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 102, at 162, 165.
104. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 1351–52.
105. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 1
Farrand’s Records, supra note 102, at 22.
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federal and state courts to prefer “the supreme Law of the Land” over contrary
state law. The Clause, however, is not entirely one-sided because it
incorporates several powerful political and procedural safeguards of federalism.
The Clause recognizes only three sources of law as “the supreme Law of the
Land”: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States.”106 The negative implication of the
Clause is that, in the absence of these sources, state law continues to govern.107
Elsewhere, the Constitution prescribes precise procedures to govern the
adoption of each source of law recognized by the Supremacy Clause as “the
supreme Law of the Land.”108 Although different in important respects, all of
these procedures assign responsibility for adopting such supreme law solely to
actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism. These actors include the
President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives. Significantly, none of
these procedures includes Article III judges. As Madison explained, the role of
the states in the selection and composition of the President, the Senate, and the
House of Representatives ensures that “each of the principal branches of the
federal government will owe its existence to the favor of the State
governments.”109 In this way, the constitutional structure retards “new
intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.”110
All of the lawmaking procedures prescribed by the Constitution magnify
the effect of the political safeguards of federalism by denying any single
participant in the lawmaking process the power to make federal law
unilaterally. Rather, all forms of “the supreme Law of the Land” must be
adopted by the Senate acting in conjunction with at least one other actor. For
example, the Constitution provides that constitutional amendments ordinarily
receive the approval of two thirds of the House and the Senate and three fourths
of the states.111 Similarly, the Constitution generally requires federal statutes to
be approved by the House, the Senate, and the President.112 Finally, the
Constitution specifies that treaties be submitted by the President and approved

106. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
107. Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 489, 498 (1954) (“The federal law which governs the exercise of state authority is obviously
interstitial law, assuming the existence of, and depending for its impact upon, the underlying
bodies of state law.”).
108. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
109. The Federalist No. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
110. Wechsler, supra note 11, at 558.
111. See U.S. Const. art. V. Ordinarily, two thirds of the House and Senate propose
amendments for ratification by the states. U.S. Const. art. V. Alternatively, “on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,” id., Congress “shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments.” Id. This procedure has never been used but, in any event, the states (for
whom the Senate was designed to serve as a proxy) would participate directly both in calling the
Convention and in ratifying its proposals.
112. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
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by two thirds of the Senators present.113 Although the effectiveness of the
political safeguards of federalism has waned over time,114 federal lawmaking
procedures continue to constrain federal lawmaking simply by establishing
multiple “veto gates,”115 and thus effectively creating a supermajority
requirement.116 If any of the specified veto players withholds its consent, then
no new supreme law is created and state law remains undisturbed.117 Thus, the
Constitution is carefully structured to restrict both who may exercise
lawmaking power on behalf of the United States (actors subject to the political
safeguards of federalism) and how they may exercise it (only with the
participation and assent of at least one other similarly-situated actor).
The constitutional structure suggests, moreover, that the lawmaking
procedures established by the Constitution are the exclusive means of adopting
“the supreme Law of the Land”118—a point crucial to understanding Erie. The
113. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
114. For example, the Seventeenth Amendment has reduced the states’ influence in the
Senate by replacing appointment of Senators by state legislatures with popular elections. See U.S.
Const. amend. XVII. Changes in constitutional law have also limited the states’ ability to
influence the House of Representatives through control over voter qualifications and districting.
See U.S. Const. XV (race); id. amend. XIX (sex); id. amend. XXIV (poll tax); id. amend. XXVI
(age). Finally, the states’ modern practice of appointing presidential electors on the basis of
winner-take-all popular elections has reduced the role of state legislatures in selecting the
President and all but eliminated the possibility that the President will be selected by the House of
Representatives voting by states.
115. See McNollgast [Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast],
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo. L.J. 705,
707 & n.5 (1992).
116. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
74–75 (2001); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s Theorem,
Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 Duke L.J.
948, 956; Michael B. Rappaport, Amending the Constitution to Establish Fiscal Supermajority
Rules, 13 J.L. & Pol. 705, 712 (1997).
117. See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1733, 1792 (2005) (“A
national government that can act only with difficulty, after all, will tend to leave considerable
scope for state autonomy.”). Some commentators and judges have even pointed to the existence of
the political safeguards of federalism as a reason to curtail judicial review of the scope of federal
powers. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647–51 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined
by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg); id. at 660–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528, 551 (1985); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 175 (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of
National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale L.J. 1552, 1557
(1977). Whatever the merits of this suggestion, see Clark, Supremacy Clause, supra note 101, there
is widespread agreement that the political safeguards built into the original constitutional structure
were meant to preserve the governance prerogatives of the states.
118. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“It emerges clearly that the prescription
for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power
of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.”); see also Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 1328–72
(arguing that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution suggest that the procedures
specified in the Constitution are the exclusive means of adopting the “Constitution,” “Laws,” and
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Senate is the only federal institution required by these procedures to participate
in all forms of federal lawmaking.119 It is common knowledge that the
Founders specifically designed the Senate to represent the states in the new
federal government. By requiring the participation and assent of the Senate in
all forms of federal lawmaking, the Founders effectively gave the states
(through their representatives in the Senate) the ability to veto all attempts to
adopt “the supreme Law of the Land.” As George Mason explained at the
Constitutional Convention:
The State Legislatures . . . ought to have some means of defending
themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl. Govt. In every other
department we have studiously endeavored to provide for its selfdefence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means for
this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the giving
them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the
Natl. Establishment.120
If agents of the federal government—and more specifically, federal courts—
were free to adopt supreme law outside of the lawmaking procedures
prescribed by the Constitution, they could deprive the states’ representatives in
the Senate of their essential gatekeeping role under the constitutional
structure.121
B. Erie and the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause provides substantial support for Professor
Mishkin’s account of Erie. Although Mishkin neither cites nor discusses the
Clause, his analysis seems to presuppose its effect. For example, he denies
“that any time Congress could validly displace state law, the federal courts are
constitutionally equally empowered to do so.”122 In his view, “[p]rinciples
related to the separation of powers impose an additional limit on the authority
of federal courts to engage in lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by

“Treaties” of the United States).
119. The only potential exception is the possibility that the states themselves will trigger a
convention for proposing constitutional amendments under Article V, thus relieving the House
and Senate of this responsibility. See supra note 111.
120. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 7, 1787), in 1 Farrand’s
Records, supra note 102, at 155–56.
121. The Founders understood that these procedural safeguards of federalism would make
it more difficult to adopt all forms of supreme federal law, but thought that “[t]he injury which
may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage
of preventing a number of bad ones.” The Federalist No. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
122. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 1683; see also Hill, supra note 52, at 441 (stating that “even
if a particular area is one in which the federal government has power to make independent law, it
does not follow that a federal court also has power to do so”); Monaghan, supra note 91, at 11–12
(stating that “federal judicial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the scope of
dormant congressional power”).
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Congress).”123 Mishkin’s invocation of the separation of powers is an essential
step toward identifying Erie’s constitutional source. Taken alone, however, this
step may not suffice to persuade those who doubt Erie’s constitutional
foundation. The general notion of separation of powers is susceptible of
numerous understandings and no single theory has gained universal
acceptance.124 Moreover, at the time when Mishkin wrote, commentators
tended to discuss separation of powers in general terms. Thus, the key to
understanding Erie is to focus on the precise interaction between the separation
of powers and the political safeguards of federalism—interaction necessitated
by operation of the Supremacy Clause.
Since 1974, the Supreme Court has decided a large number of separation
of powers cases and has made clear that the “principle of separation of powers
was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was
woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787.”125 One of the ways in which the Founders incorporated the separation of
powers into the Constitution was to prescribe precise lawmaking procedures to
govern the adoption of each source of supreme federal law. All of these
procedures require the participation and assent of multiple actors, thus allowing
each to function as a check on the others. For example, in order for a “Bill” to
become a “Law,” it must be passed by both the House of Representatives and
the Senate and then presented to the President for his approval.126 If the
President disapproves, the bill will become law only if approved by two thirds
of both Houses.127 Under these procedures, the House, the Senate, and the
President all check each other in the lawmaking process.
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has made clear that constitutionally
prescribed lawmaking procedures are “integral parts of the constitutional
design for the separation of powers,”128 and that courts should vigorously
enforce such procedures. For example, in INS v. Chadha, the Court invalidated
the “legislative veto” on the ground that it allowed one House to exercise
“essentially legislative” power129 and was therefore inconsistent with “the

123. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 1683.
124. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation In Separation of Powers Law, 86
Va. L. Rev. 1127 (2000); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725
(1996); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513
(1991); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 225; Martin H. Reddish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism In Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449 (1991); Harold J. Krent,
Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1253 (1988); Peter
L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987).
125. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
126. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
127. Id.
128. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
129. Id. at 952.
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Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government
[should] be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.”130 Similarly, in Clinton v. City of New York,131 the
Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act, which allowed the President to
“cancel” certain tax and spending provisions after they became law.132
According to the Court, “[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has
amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.”133 Because
such action occurred outside the Constitution’s exclusive lawmaking
procedures, the Court “conclude[d] that the Act’s cancellation provisions
violate Article I, § 7, of the Constitution.”134
In prior writings, I have argued that strict adherence to federal lawmaking
procedures not only furthers the Constitution’s separation of powers, but also
safeguards federalism both by making federal law more difficult to adopt and
by assigning lawmaking power exclusively to actors subject to the political
safeguards of federalism.135 The Supremacy Clause is the provision that
actually secures these protections. By recognizing only the “Constitution,”
“Laws,” and “Treaties” as “the supreme Law of the Land,” the Clause
necessarily incorporates the precise lawmaking procedures prescribed
elsewhere in the Constitution for the adoption of each source of supreme
federal law.136 And by conferring supremacy only on laws adopted according to
these procedures, the Supremacy Clause provides an express constitutional
basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie to abandon the Swift doctrine.137
Although Erie does not cite the Supremacy Clause, the first sentence of
the Court’s constitutional analysis essentially paraphrases the effect of the
Clause: “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”138 This
formulation presupposes that federal courts have no independent lawmaking
authority to displace state law. Rather, they may override state law only when
authorized to do so by a provision of “the supreme Law of the Land.”139 Under
the Constitution, such preemptive federal law can only be adopted pursuant to
the “finely wrought and exhaustively considered”140 procedures set forth in the

130. Id. at 951.
131. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
132. Id. at 436.
133. Id. at 438.
134. Id. at 448.
135. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 1324.
136. See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text.
137. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13 at 1414 (“Careful analysis reveals that
Erie’s constitutional holding is best understood as an attempt to enforce federal lawmaking
procedures and the political safeguards of federalism they incorporate.”).
138. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Of course, the Supremacy Clause refers not only to the
“Constitution” and “Laws,” but also to “Treaties.” See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
139. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
140. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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Constitution.141 These procedures assign federal lawmaking exclusively to the
political branches of the federal government and to the states. By design, these
procedures give federal courts no role in the process. Erie arguably invoked
this omission when it proclaimed that “[t]here is no federal general common
law,”142 and that “no clause in the Constitution purports to confer . . . power
upon the federal courts”143 “to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state.”144
The Swift doctrine ran afoul of the Constitution by permitting federal
courts to displace state law outside the Supremacy Clause in favor of their own
body of judge-made law. Whatever its original justification, the Swift doctrine
141. To be sure, several potential counterexamples have arisen since Erie was decided. For
example, federal administrative agencies now regularly promulgate rules that preempt state law.
See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737 (2004). Even in this
context, however, the Supreme Court has conditioned preemption on congressional authorization.
See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (stating that “an agency literally
has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless
and until Congress confers power upon it”); Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 143038. Another potential counterexample is the rise of sole executive agreements—i.e., international
agreements made by the President alone without the participation or assent of either house of
Congress. The Court has recently stated that such agreements are generally “fit to preempt state
law, just as treaties are.” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003). For a critique of
this position, see Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi and Executive Preemption In Foreign Affairs, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825 (2004);
see also Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2007). An examination of these doctrines is beyond the scope of this paper.
142. 304 U.S. at 78. One might think that modern “federal common law” contradicts this
understanding of Erie. Federal common law usually refers to rules of decision that purport to have
the force of federal law, but whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of
interpretation to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. See Clark, Federal
Common Law, supra note 8, at 1247. Even with respect to such rules, however, the pull of Erie
and the Supremacy Clause is in evidence. The Supreme Court has rejected open-ended federal
common lawmaking and attempted to confine judicial lawmaking to “such narrow areas as those
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes
. . ., and admiralty disputes.” Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). As I
have argued elsewhere, many of the rules that make up these enclaves have arguably been
mischaracterized because they are actually “consistent with, and frequently required by, the
constitutional structure,” and thus do not constitute authentic “federal common law.” Clark,
Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1251. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers
of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1985) (suggesting that some federal common
lawmaking—i.e., “delegated” and “preemptive” lawmaking—is legitimate because authorized by
Congress). Even admiralty—the most entrenched enclave of federal common law—has recently
been called into question as inconsistent with Erie. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
459 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the
Court’s modern admiralty doctrine represents “an unwarranted assertion of judicial authority to
strike down or confine state legislation . . . without any firm grounding in constitutional text or
principle”); Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1360 (comparing federal common law
in admiralty to general commercial law under Swift); Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, 279 (1999) (arguing that “we would do better to follow Erie by largely
abandoning the effort to construct federal common law rules in admiralty cases that arise within
state territorial waters”).
143. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
144. Id.
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eventually degenerated into an excuse for federal courts to make their own
body of law in diversity cases. As Justice Field stressed in dissent, the “general
law” applied by federal courts under the Swift doctrine was “little less than
what the judge advancing the doctrine [thought] at the time should be the
general law on a particular subject.”145 Judicial lawmaking on this scale
circumvented the political and procedural safeguards built into the Supremacy
Clause, and in this sense “invaded rights . . . reserved by the Constitution to the
several States.”146 Erie made clear that under the Constitution “[t]here is no
federal general common law.”147 Rather, the “common law so far as it is
enforced in a State . . . is not the common law generally but the law” as
declared by the courts of that state.148 Because the Swift doctrine allowed
federal courts to disregard such state law in favor of general law of their own
choosing, the Erie Court felt “compel[led]” to abandon the doctrine149 as “‘an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States.’” 150
Viewing Erie through the lens of the Supremacy Clause also helps to
explain the “development of two separate lines of cases”151 to determine
whether federal courts should apply state or federal law to matters that fall
“within the uncertain area between substance and procedure.”152 Under Erie,
federal courts sitting in diversity are bound to apply the substantive law of the
state in which they sit, but remain free to apply federal procedural rules. The
line between substance and procedure is murky at best, and the Supreme Court
has devised two seemingly contradictory approaches for deciding whether to
apply state or federal rules. On the one hand, in the absence of an applicable
federal statute or federal rule, the Court employs tests that encourage the
application of arguably substantive state law over a contrary federal practice.153
145. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting). See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 431 (1995) (explaining that by the
time Erie was decided, changing conceptions of state law revealed the “fundamentally political
reality” that “what a judge was doing when he decided an open question of common law was
making law rather than finding law”).
146. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
147. Id. at 78.
148. Id. at 79. Of course, when state law is not clear, federal courts often risk usurping state
authority by “predicting” how the state’s highest court would rule. See Clark, Ascertaining, supra
note 13, at 1495–1517. When possible, federal courts can avoid this risk by certifying unsettled
questions of state law to the state’s highest court for authoritative resolution. See id. at 1544–56;
see also Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring A Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1293 (2003) (advocating various types of certification).
149. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77–78.
150. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 534 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
151. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1964).
152. Id. at 472.
153. Over time, the Court has instructed courts to choose between state law and federal
practice by asking whether “the outcome of the litigation” would be “substantially different” in
federal rather than state court, Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); whether the state
rule was “intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties,”
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On the other hand, when there is a federal statute or rule on point, the Court
employs a strong presumption in favor of applying arguably procedural federal
law over contrary state law.154
The Supremacy Clause reconciles these two approaches by providing a
constitutional basis for choosing between state and federal law. In the absence
of an applicable federal statute or rule (promulgated pursuant to a federal
statute), the negative implication of the Supremacy Clause precludes federal
courts from displacing substantive state law. Accordingly, under the Clause—
and thus under Erie—courts should err in favor of applying state substantive
law absent positive federal law to the contrary. By contrast, when Congress—
or the Supreme Court acting pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act155—adopts a
federal rule on point, the rule qualifies as “the supreme Law of the Land.”156
Under these circumstances, the only question for the judiciary is whether the
particular rule falls within Congress’s constitutional power to enact.157 If so, the
Supremacy Clause instructs courts to follow the federal rule notwithstanding
contrary state law, whether characterized as “substantive” or “procedural.”

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958); and whether the application of
state law furthers “the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. If a federal court
answers in the affirmative, then it should apply state law absent “affirmative countervailing
considerations.” Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537; see id. at 538 (finding that “the federal policy favoring
jury decisions of disputed fact questions” constitutes an adequate countervailing consideration).
154. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (stating that when “a federal
statute covers the point in dispute,” a federal court need only “inquire whether the statute
represents a valid exercise of Congress’ authority under the Constitution”); Burlington N. R.R. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (stating that so long as a federal rule falls within the scope of the
Rules Enabling Act, the only question is whether the rule “regulates matters which can reasonably
be classified as procedural, thereby satisfying the constitutional standard for validity”).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
156. The Supreme Court has long permitted Congress to assign rulemaking power to
federal courts on the theory that such power is not “strictly and exclusively legislative.” Wayman
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825). The Court has recognized that “[c]ertain
implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
institution,” United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812), and that these
powers include authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure for federal courts,
notwithstanding contrary state rules applicable in state court. See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 212, 222–23 (1818).
157. The Supremacy Clause recognizes only “Laws . . . made in Pursuance” of the
Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. This language contemplates that courts will review the
constitutionality of federal statutes before treating them as “the supreme Law of the Land.” See
Clark, Supremacy Clause, supra note 101, at 99–105. Of course, Congress has broad
constitutional power under Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause “to make rules
governing the practice and pleading in [federal] courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are
rationally capable of classification as either.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
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Conclusion
The Swift doctrine permitted judges to displace traditional doctrines of
state common law in favor of their own independent notions of sound public
policy. Erie overruled Swift on the ground that it was inconsistent with “‘the
autonomy and independence of the States.’”158 Such language has led
commentators to analyze Erie largely in terms of traditional principles of
federalism. Paul Mishkin’s key insight was to link federalism with the
constitutional separation of powers. As he put it, federal “courts are
inappropriate makers of laws intruding upon the states’ views of social policy
in the areas of state competence.”159 The Supremacy Clause supplies specific
textual, historical, and structural support for Mishkin’s conclusions because the
Clause incorporates federal lawmaking procedures that, by design, exclude
participation by federal courts. The myth of Erie, it turns out, actually rests on
the sound structural inference that the Supremacy Clause precludes federal
courts from acting outside its terms to displace state law.

158.
159.

Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Baugh, 141 U.S. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting)).
Mishkin, supra note 2, at 1686–87.

